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THE DEATH OF THE
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST-
JOHNSON V. LaGRANGE STATE BANK
Although Illinois laws protect the rights of a surviving spouse in the
estate of a decedent,' that protection may be diminished when a de-
cedent spouse, by making lifetime transfers, reduces the amount of
property that will pass to the survivors through the probate estate.
Surviving spouses have challenged such lifetime transfers as being a
fraud on their marital rights. 2 In adjudicating these contests, courts
have traditionally weighed two competing policy considerations: the
freedom of the decedent spouse to alienate his or her property and
the interest of the state in providing for the welfare of the surviving
spouse and family. 3
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-8(a) (1975) provides:
If a will is renounced by the testator's surviving spouse, whether or not the will
contains any provision for the benefit of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse
is entitled to the following share of the testator's estate aler payment of all just
claims: 1/3 of the entire estate if the testator leaves a descendant or of the entire
estate if the testator leaves no descendant.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-1 (1975) provides:
The intestate real and personal estate of a resident decedent and the intestate real
estate in his State of a nonresident decedent, after all just claims against his estate
are fully paid, descends and shall be distributed as follows:
(a) If there is a surviving spouse and also a descendant of the decedent: '/a of the
entire estate to the decedent's descendant's per stirpes.
(c) If there is a surviving spouse but no descendant of the decedent: the entire
estate to the surviving spouse.
2. Many different types of transfers have been challenged. For instance, surviving spouses
have attacked a number of joint tenancy arrangements. See, e.g., Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill.2d
62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962); Holmes v. Mims, I Ill.2d 274, 115 N.E.2d 790 (1953); Hoeffner v.
Hoeffner, 389 I11. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 (1945); Toman v. Svoboda, 39 Ill. App.3d 394, 349
N.E.2d 668 (1st Dist. 1976); Mis v. Mindykowski, 23 I11. App.3d 916, 320 N.E.2d 450 (1st Dist.
1974). Also a surviving spouse has challenged a transfer in which the decedent spouse remained
co-owner of savings bonds with his daughter. See Levites v. Levites, 27 I11. App.2d 274, 169
N.E.2d 574 (1st Dist. 1960). Additionally, there has been litigation involving trusts. Trusts
which have been challenged include trusts in which the settlor has not reserved any rights or
powers, Williams v. Evans, 154 I11. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895); Padfield v. Padfield, 78 I11. 16
(1875); Stoxen v. Stoxen, 6 Ill. App.3d 445, 285 N.E.2d 198 (2d Dist. 1972); trusts in which the
settlor has reserved the right to income, Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 I11. App. 635
(1912); irrevocable trusts, Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 43 Ill.2d 312, 253 N.E.2d 42
(1969); revocable trusts in which the settlors reserved the right to the income and the right to
control the administration of the corpus, Burnet v. First National Bank, 12 I11. App.2d 514, 140
N.E.2d 362 (1st Dist. 1957); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 I11. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1st
Dist. 1944); and Totten trusts, Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill.2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973);
Mertes v. Lincoln Park Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. of Chicago, 34 I11. App.3d 557, 340 N.E.2d 25
(1st Dist. 1975).
3. See Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U.
Ci. L. REv. 681-85 (1966). Plager suggests that these policy considerations could be
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In Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank, 4 the most recent Illinois case
involving a challenge to a lifetime transfer, the surviving husband at-
tacked the validity of a revocable inter vivos trust 5 created by his
wife for the benefit of her relatives and various charities 6 as being a
fraud on his marital rights. In the agreement establishing the trust,
the decedent designated herself as trustee 7 and retained the right to
receive income earned from the trust principal. In addition, she re-
served the power to invade the principal at her sole discretion and
retained the unilateral right to alter, amend, and modify the trust 8
rationalized by reforming our present system of providing for the welfare of the surviving
spouse through the use of the minimum statutory share (see note 1, supra). As an alternative,
he suggests a system of maintenance payments made to the surviving spouse out of the dece-
dent's estate. The amount of payment would be geared, inter alia, to the individual need of the
survivor, the interests of the persons otherwise entitled to the deceased's property, the conduct
of the survivor in relation to the deceased and the deceased's reasons for his testamentary plan.
See also, Comment, Trusts and Trustees-Totten Trusts-Right of a Surviving Spouse to have
a Totten Trust Included in His Deceased Spouse's Estate for Purposes of Determining His
Statutory Share, 1973 U. ILL. L. F. 775 [hereinafter cited as Comment].
4. 50 111. App.3d 830, 365 N.E.2d 1056 (1st Dist. 1977).
5. "A trust is a fiduciary relationship in which one person is the holder of the title to the
property subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of
another." G. BOcERT, LAW OF TRUSTS 1 (4th ed. 1963). Bogert explains that the trust is con-
ceived as being the relationship between property and persons incidental to which are certain
rights and duties. The totality of property, persons, rights, and duties makes up the trust.
Trusts created by the settlor during his lifetime are called inter vivos trusts. In contrast,
trusts created by will are called "testamentary" trusts. J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD JR., R. EFF-
LAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 374 (5th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as DECEDENTS'
ESTATES AND TRUSTS].
6. Beneficiaries under the trust were decedent's mother, sister, niece, and various
charities. Upon the happening of certain contingencies, the unborn descendents of decedent's
niece were also beneficiaries of the trust. A provision in the trust directed the successor trustee
to pay so much income and principal of the trust estate as was necessary to meet any
emergency situation for the reasonable support, medical and burial expense of the surviving
husband. 50 I11. App.3d at 833-34; 365 N.E.2d at 1058.
7. As trustee, decedent retained broad powers to invest, reinvest, divide, and distribute
the trust assets. Upon her death, Mrs. Johnson designated LaGrange State Bank as successor
trustee. Id., 365 N.E.2d at 1059.
8. On the same day Mrs. Johnson created the trust, she also executed a will. Among other
.bequests, decedent bequeathed her personal effects and real estate to her husband, id. at
833-34, 365 N.E.2d at 1058-59. Prior to her death, however, the decedent sold her home, the
only real property she owned. The proceeds ($75,000) were placed in a bank account owned in
joint tenancy with her husband. Brief for Appellee, at 15. Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank, 50
I11. App.3d 830, 365 N.E.2d 1056 (1st Dist. 1977).
The corpus of the trust consisted of money and securities valued at $200,000 given to Mrs.
Johnson by her husband. The surviving husband's net worth at time of trial was $2.25 million.
Evidence in the record showed that the surviving spouse had some knowledge of decedent's
contract with her attorney for the purpose of preparing a trust instrument and will. He chose
not to involve himself in that contract. The trial court found that there was no estrangement of
feeling during the Johnsons' marriage of 35 years and that there was deep love and affection
between husband and wife. Id. at 14-17.
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The Circuit Court of Cook County upheld the trust and rejected
the allegations that the decedent had committed fraud upon the
plaintiff.9 On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court and
distinguished the tests for determining what constitutes a fraud on
the marital rights of a surviving spouse and for ascertaining common
law fraud. 10 The appellate court then examined the trust agreement
to determine if the settlor" relinquished any incidents of ownership
in establishing the trust. 12 In so doing, the court relied on a "reten-
tion of control" test 13 developed in prior Illinois decisions.14 The
court found that in light of the numerous powers retained by the
settlor, the decedent had effectively retained ultimate control over
the trust assets during her lifetime. Accordingly, the court held that
the trust could not be permitted to defeat the marital rights of the
9. Plaintiff's complaint included three counts. Count I alleged the trust to be an illusory
and colorable transfer of the trust property and a fraud upon his marital rights. Count II alleged
that the decedent established the trust with the intention of defeating plaintiff's marital interest
in the settlor's personal estate. Count III averred the decedent acted in an intentional, deliber-
ate and fraudulent manner for the purpose of denying plaintiff his statutory share of the dece-
dent's estate. The court dismissed counts I and II of the amended complaint but allowed count
III to stand. 50 I11. App.3d at 832, 365 N.E.2d at 1057-58.
10. The Johnson court further explains that the expression "fraud on the marital rights"
should be viewed as words of art. The court adds that "fraud on the marital rights" is an
unfortunate phrase since the word "fraud" adds rampant connotations. Id. at 836, 365 N.E.2d at
1060, citing, Stoxen v. Stoxen, 6 I11. App. 3d 445, 447, 285 N.E.2d 198, 199 (2d Dist. 1972). In
Stoxen, decedent intentionally placed title to real estate in a land trust in order to deprive his
wife of her minimum statutory share in his estate. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action since plaintiff did not allege the elements of common law fraud in her
complaint. The court found that the kind of fraud alleged by the plaintiff was not the type of
fraud founded upon misrepresentation, but one based upon the statutory right under the forced
share statute (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-8 (a) (1976)). See note 1 supra. See also, Blankenship
v. Hall, 233 11. 116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908). The court in Blankenship interpreted the Frauds and
Perjuries Act (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, § 4 (1905)). The act provides:
[E]very gift, grant, conveyance . . . made with the intent to disturb, delay, hinder
or defraud creditors or other persons . . . shall be void, as against such creditors,
purchasers and other persons.
The court held that the phrase "creditors and other persons" does not include the wife of the
grantor with reference to her right under specific circumstances to take a one-half interest in his
real estate in lieu of dower. Id. at 125-30, 84 N.E.2d at 195-97.
11. A settlor is the person creating the trust. DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS, supra
note 5 at 374.
12. 50 I11. App.3d at 841-42, 365 N.E.2d at 1063-64.
13. The Johnson court refers to this test as the "retention of ownership" test. Id. at 837, 365
N.E.2d at 1061. However, this test is commonly referred to as the retention of control test by
legal writers. See, e.g., W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE, 67-87 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as MACDONALD]. Therefore, this test will be referred to as the "retention of
control test" throughout this article.
14. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill.2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973); Smith v.
Northern Trust Co., 322 I11. App. 168, 54 N.E. 2d 75 (1st Dist. 1944). See notes 28-47 and
accompanying text infra.
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surviving spouse. 15  Because the court employed a test which looks
solely to the structure of the trust agreement, the decision makes the
revocable trust more susceptible to attack by a surviving spouse. As a
result, the effectiveness of the inter vivos trust as an estate planning
tool is weakened. This decision has been appealed to the Illinois Su-
preme Court.16
The purpose of this Note is to review the developing case law in
the area of inter vivos transfers by a decedent spouse with respect to
the rights of a surviving spouse. Specifically, the Note will examine
and evaluate the appellate court's decision in Johnson. It also will
analyze the Johnson opinion in light of Public Act 80-737,17 a sub-
sequently enacted statute'18 which may be interpreted in certain cir-
cumstances to uphold the validity of inter vivos transfers despite the
settlor's retention of control over the property.' 9 Finally, the poten-
tial ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court will be discussed.
WHAT CONSTITUTES FRAuD ON MARITAL RIGHTS
In its opinion, the appellate court discussed two approaches 20
15. 50 111. App.3d at 841-42, 365 N.E.2d at 1063-64.
16. On January 26, 1978, Havey v. Patton, 52 111. App.3d 897, 368 N.E.2d 728 (4th Dist.
1977) was consolidated with Johnson for hearing before the supreme court. In Havey, the
executor of the decedent husband's estate sought to have certain accounts which the decedent
wife conveyed in joint tenancy to her sister-in-law included in the wife's probate estate. Also,
the executor sought to include in the wife's probate estate a conveyance of the wife's undivided
one-half interest in the family home in which she reserved a life estate. The deed was recorded
but not delivered. The appellate court held that there was sufficient donative intent to sustain
the gift of the accounts placed in joint tenancy. In so holding, the court stated that fraud arises
not out of intent to defeat or minimize the marital rights of the surviving spouse, but from the
absence of donative intent. id. at 900, 368 N.E.2d 730. The court also upheld the conveyance
of the one-half interest in the family home stating that delivery was completed after the deed
was recorded and it was returned to the office of the wife's attorney. Id. at 901, 368 N.E.2d
.731.
17. See note 68 and accompanying text infra.
18. The Act was passed in reaction to Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 ll.2d 532, 301 N.E.2d
465 (1973). See Remarks by Sherman Corwin, Judiciary Committee I of the Illinois House of
Representatives (April 6, 1977).
19. See notes 68-85 and accompanying text infra [hereinafter called the Illusory Transfer
Act].
20. For a state by state discussion of decisions involving the use of trusts to impair surviving
spouses' rights, see Annot. 39 A.L.R.3d 14 (1971). See also Schuyler, Revocable Trusts-
Spouses, Creditors and Other Predators 8 INST. EST. PLAN. § 74.1300-74.1301 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Schuyler]. Schuyler explains that American jurisdictions base the claim of the sur-
viving spouse on one of three legal theories. The first theory is that the transfer was testamen-
tary in character and invalid because it was not executed in a manner specified for the execution
of wills. According to Schuyler, the "testamentary" approach is less likely to succeed because at
least 43 states have passed statutes to insulate revocable trusts from attack based on the tes-
tamentary nature of the trust instrument. The second theory is that the transfers constituted a
fraud on the spouse's marital rights. Schuyler explains that in this approach "fraud" is shown
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which have been considered by prior Illinois courts in determining
whether an inter vivos transfer defrauds a surviving spouse of his or
her marital rights. 21 According to this first view, fraud is determined
by examining the manifestations of intent ("equities") of the decedent.
In actuality, these "equities" are used to determine the reasonable-
ness of the transfer. 22  These equitable factors include the decedent's
intent to defraud his spouse, the proximity in time between the
transfer and the transferor's death, the proportion of the settlor's
property transfen'ed to the trust, the absence of consideration received
from the transferee, and the fairness to the surviving spouse if the
trust is operative.2 3  Although this approach was considered by the
appellate court, it has been employed in only one Illinois case: Rose
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.2 4  In Rose, the Illinois Supreme Court
construed a Missouri statute 25 which governed inter vivos transfers 26
made in fraud of the marital rights of a surviving spouse. 27
either by establishing the fraudulent intent of the settlor or by carefully balancing the "equities"
in the case. The third theory is that the transfer was "illusory" in that the settlor did not
sufficiently divest himself of ownership of the trust property. Id. § 74.1301.
21. 50 111. App.3d at 836, 365 N.E.2d at 1060-61.
22. MAcDONALD, supra note 13 at 103-16.
23. Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 43 lll.2d 312, 316, 253 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1969). See
also MAcDONALD supra note 13 at 145-74. MacDonald attempted to categorize the "equities"
based on several hundred American cases on the subject. He categorizes these factors into
major equities and minor equities. Major equities are given the greatest amount of considera-
tion by the courts. They are the proportion of decedent's property included in the transfer, the
proximity of the transfer to the date of death, any provision made by the decedent for the
surviving spouse, the relationship of the donee, and the participation by the donee. The minor
equities are those given a lesser amount of consideration by the courts. They are the source of
decedent's property, the nature of the marriage and the claimant's financial position.
Compare with Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 14, 19 (1971). The authors state that some courts recog-
nize that the settlor's purpose of depriving his (or her) spouse of his (or her) marital rights is not
sufficient to establish whether the settlor acted with fraudulent intent in creating the trust.
Thus, the authors state that in determining fraudulent intent, such courts have looked to and
weighed all of the facts and circumstances of each case including: the terms of the trust and the
settlor's reserved powers of ownership and control; the voluntary nature of the settlor's con-
veyance of the property; the time interval between the conveyance and the settlor's death; the
value of the property conveyed in comparison to the settlor's total estate and to the value of the
property passing to the surviving spouse outside the trust; and the relationship existing between
the settlor and his (or her) spouse.
24. 43 Ill.2d 312, 253 N.E.2d 417 (1969).
25. Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.150 (1975) provides:
Any gift made by a person, whether dying testate or intestate, in fraud of the
marital rights of the surviving spouse to share in his estate, shall, at the election of
the surviving spouse, be treated as a testamentary disposition and may be recovered
from the donee and persons taking from him with adequate consideration and
applied to the payment of the spouse's share, as in case of his election to take
against the will.
Although the trust in Rose was executed by a resident of Illinois, the supreme court held that
Missouri law controlled the validity of the trust. The court considered the following factors: the
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In the second approach, "fraud" is determined by examining the
degree of control retained by the decedent over the transferred as-
sets. The rationale underlying this view is that the more control exer-
cised over the assets, the more apparent it is that the decedent in
reality owned the property. 28 Therefore, the surviving spouse's
minimum statutory share should not be defeated. In its opinion, the
appellate court cited Smith v. Northern Trust Co.,29 the first Illinois
case to adopt this approach. It is necessary to review the Smith deci-
sion in order to understand the development of the "retention of con-
trol" test in Illinois case law.
In Smith, the appellate court invalidated a revocable trust in which
the decedent spouse retained the right to control the trust corpus and
the right to income as against the surviving spouse. 30 In its decision,
the court stated that an absolute inter vivos gift of personalty by a
decedent spouse is not a fraud on the marital rights of the surviving
spouse even though made with the purpose of depriving the surviving
spouse of the right to share in such property, provided that the
transfer is not "colorable." ' 31 The court held that although the
transfer in Smith was absolute in form, it was merely "colorable" and
"illusory" in substance because of the degree of control that the de-
cedent spouse maintained over the trust corpus. 32
In reaching its decision, the Smith court discussed Newman v.
Dore,3 3 a New York case which had also established a "retention of
trust was negotiated and executed in Missouri, the trust was administered by a Missouri corpo-
ration with its principal place of business in Missouri, the trust corpus was kept in Missouri, the
trust agreement used Missouri law to determine rights to the corpus should the grantor die
without his wife or children surviving him. 43 Ill.2d at 313, 253 N.E.2d at 418.
26. The Missouri statute refers to gifts, not transfers. Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.150 (1975).
27. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions that Missouri
law required that the "equities" be considered in determining whether an irrevocable trust
created by a decedent husband was a fraud on the marital rights of his wife. 43 Ill.2d at 315,
253 N.E.2d at 419.
28. MAcDONALD, supra note 13 at 68.
29. 322 I11. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1st Dist. 1944). See generally Recent Decision, 23
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87 (1944).
30. Id. at 176, 54 N.E. 2d at 78.
31. Id. A colorable transfer is one in which the transferor did not "in good faith divest
himself of ownership of his property or has made an illusory transfer." Id. at 174, 54 N.E.2d at
77, quoting, Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 379, 9 N.E.2d 966, 969 (1937). See also note 80
and accompanying text infra.
32. 322 I11 App. at 176, 54 N.E.2d at 78.
33. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). In Newman, the decedent spouse created a tes-
tamentary trust under which his widow was given a life estate in one-third of all his property.
The terms of a New York statute prevented the widow from electing against the will. Three
days before his death and with the intent to defraud his wife's statutory rights, decedent created
an inter vivos trust of all his property. He retained the right to receive income from the trust
and the power to revoke the trust. He also made the power of the trustees to act under trust
[Vol. 27:911
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control" test and expressly rejected any consideration of the dece-
dent's intent to defraud the surviving spouse. In Smith, however, the
Illinois Appellate Court did not accept the Newman decision totally.
The Illinois court merely adopted the retention of control approach of
Newman without reference to Newman's expressed refusal to consider
intent.3 4 Furthermore, the court indirectly evaluated the decedent's
intent to defraud his spouse by considering the equitable factors
traditionally associated with the intent approach. Specifically, the
court emphasized that the trust corpus constituted all of the dece-
dent's property except his pension.3 5 Also, in its presentation of the
facts, the court acknowledged that the decedent amended the trust to
exclude his surviving spouse while the couple was temporarily es-
tranged.3 6  Consequently, although Illinois courts purportedly have
adopted only the "retention of control" test, they have continued to
evaluate equitable factors. This inconsistency has given rise to re-
peated attempts by attorneys to persuade Illinois courts to formally
recognize equitable factors in determining the validity of inter vivos
trusts as against surviving spouses.3 7
conditional upon their receipt of his written instructions. The court found that the trust was
illusory in that the decedent did not in good faith divest himself of the property. Id. at 381, 9
N.E.2d at 969-70.
For general commentary on how Newman and other New York cases relate to Illinois law,
see Comment, Trusts-Totten Trusts-Montgomery v. Michaels, Surviving Spouse Can Reach
a Totten Account to Extent Necessary to Meet the Statutory Share, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 688 (1974).
34. 322 II1. App. at 174, 54 N.E.2d at 77-78, quoting, Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 271, 379,
9 N.E.2d 966, 968-69 (1937):
Since the law gives the wife only an expectant interest in the property of her hus-
band which becomes part of his estate, and since the law does not restrict transfers
of property by the husband during his life, it would seem that the only sound test
of the validity of a challenged transfer is whether it is real or illusory. . . .The test
has been formulated in different ways, but in most jurisdictions the test applied is
essentially the test of whether the husband has in good faith divested himself of
ownership of his property or has made an illusory transfer.
35. 322 I11. App. at 175-76, 54 N.E.2d at 78.
36. Id. at 171, 54 N.E.2d at 76. Also, the court noted that prior to this time, the decedent
had suffered a stroke, had been diagnosed as having senile arteriosclerotic dementia and had
been institutionalized. Id.
It is interesting to note that notwithstanding the Newman court's express rejection of the
"intent" test, the New York court also seemed to consider equitable factors. In the final para-
graph of the decision, the court justified its decision by noting the husband's intent to defraud
his wife. 275 N.Y. at 381, 9 N.E.2d at 969-70.
37. In Burnet v. First National Bank, 12 Ill. App.2d 514, 140 N.E.2d 362 (1st Dist. 1957),
the executrix of the surviving spouse challenged the validity of a revocable trust where the
decedent spouse had reserved the right to income and the right to control the administration of
the trust. The court found that the settlor's absolute control over the trust did not invalidate the
trust per se and that the determination of the validity of the trust depended on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The trust provided for payment of income therefrom to the wife
during her life. The wife with full knowledge of her right of power of appointment given to her
1978]
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APPELLATE COURT DECISION
The appellate court in Johnson relied primarily on Montgomery v.
Michaels 38 in reaching its decision. In Montgomery, the decedent
spouse established a savings account or Totten trust 39 for the benefit
by trust agreement, renounced the same in her will and accepted the trust income. The court
held that the wife was estopped from claiming any interest in trust assets which was allegedly
traceable to the wife's separate property. The court also held that her executrix stood in her
shoes and was also estopped. Id. at 529, 140 N.E.2d at 369.
In Dennis v. Dennis, 132 Ill. App.2d 952, 271 N.E.2d 55 (3d Dist. 1971), the decedent
created a revocable trust where he reserved the right to income as well as the right to amend
and control the trust. The court held the trust to be valid because the settlor made the trust
irrevocable prior to his death. In so holding, the court was looking to the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case. Id. at 958-59, 271 N.E.2d at 60.
In Stice v. Nevin, 344 III. App. 642, 101 N.E.2d 873 (1st Dist. 1951), the court dismissed a
complaint of a surviving spouse who contested an amendment to a trust. The amendment
excluded the spouse as the beneficiary under the trust. The court held that where the trust
agreement included a right to amend and the wife had signed the agreement before a notary
public, the wife's administrator could not upset an amendment to the trust as a fraud on her
marital rights. In its opinion, the court acknowledged that the wife was left some property in
her husband's will. Furthermore, it was noted that the complaint contained no allegation that
the wife could not read or that there was any concealment or misrepresentation as to the terms
of the trust.
In each of the above cases, it is clear that the courts did not look solely at the amount of
control exercised by the decedent over the trust corpus. In Burnet and Stice, the settlor had as
much control over the trust assets as did the settlor in Smith and Johnson. Yet in each of the
latter cases, court upheld the trust due to the knowledge of the surviving spouse and to a
provision made for the surviving spouse by the decedent by will. In Dennis, it can be argued
that the settlor retain ultimate control over the trust because it was made irrevocable only a
short time prior to the decedent's death. Also, in Dennis, the decedent provided for his wife by
will. See also Comment, supra note 3, at 787.
38. 54 1ll.2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973).
39. A Totten trust is established by an individual making a deposit in a savings account in
his own name as trustee for another. The depositor reserves a power to withdraw the whole or
any part of the deposit at any time or to otherwise revoke the trust. The trust is then enforce-
able by the beneficiary upon the death of the depositor as to any part remaining on deposit. In
Estate of Petralia, 32 1ll.2d 34, 38, 204 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1965). The validity of a Totten trust has
been upheld in Illinois despite the contention that the trust is invalid as an attempted testamen-
tary disposition without compliance to the Statute of Wills. Id. at 137-38, 204 N.E.2d at 3. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959).
Banks and Savings and Loan Associations furnish signature cards whereby the depositor can
create a Totten trust by declaring himself trustee for the benefit of a named beneficiary. Stat-
utes protect these institutions from liability when they make payments on these accounts. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16 1/2 § 145 (1971) (applicable to banks); Id. ch. 32, §§770(c)-(e) (applicable
to savings and loan associations). These statutes, however, do not establish the validity of sav-
ings account trusts. Mann, Totten Trusts Approved in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 724, 725 (1965). See
generally, Comment supra note 3. The author lists several policy considerations justifying the
general acceptance of the Totten trust even though the trust is essentially testamentary in na-
ture. These considerations include that the Totten trust satisfies both the ritual and fraud as-
pects of the Statute of Frauds, and the very reasons for the existance of the Statute would not
be furthered by applying it to the Totten trust; that the Totten trust permits the settlor, as
trustee, to manage his (or her) own affairs and make corrections in the disposition of his (or her)
property; that the Totten trust allows persons who are unable to afford the services of an attor-
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of her two children by a prior marriage. After discussing the difficulty
of attempting to ascertain the decedent's intent, the Illinois Supreme
Court specifically rejected the "intent" test.40 Rather, the court held
that because of the "absolute unqualified control" of the settlor over
the account, the trust was "illusory" 41 as to the surviving spouse. 42
Accordingly, the court did not consider any equitable factors as pre-
vious Illinois courts had done indirectly. 43 As a result, the Supreme
Court made the Totten trust, by its inherent nature, invalid per se
against a surviving spouse. 44
In relying on Montgomery, the appellate court found the factual
situation before it "directly parallel" to that presented to the supreme
court in Montgomery.4 5 The court observed that in each case the
decedent enjoyed complete and unfettered control over the trust
property during the lifetime.46 Furthermore, the court noted that
the trust operated to exclude the surviving spouse from a sizable stat-
utory share to which the spouse otherwise would have been entitled
had the trust property passed under the will. 47
The court also found Montgomery applicable not only to Totten
trusts, but to other revocable inter vivos trusts.4 8  In support of this
ney in drafting a will to provide for a disposition of their money to named beneficiaries at their
death; that the use of the Totten trust avoids the delay and expense of probate proceedings; and
that the policy of the law is to favor the vesting of interests and to effectuate the testator's
intent, rather than frustrate it by technicalities. Id. at 779-80.
40. 54 I11. 2d at 536, 301 N.E.2d at 467.
41. As opposed to real. See quotation from Newman v. Dore, note 34 supra.
42. 54 Ill. 2d at 536, 301 N.E.2d at 467.
43. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra. See also Comment, supra note 3, at 775,
787 n.48.
44. In a Totten trust, the settlor will always have ultimate control of the assets in trust since
the trust is established in such a form as to allow the depositor to withdraw funds from the
account at his discretion. Therefore, the Totten trust will always be invalid as to the surviving
spouse. See, Nortell, Illinois Tottering Totten Trusts, 63 ILL. B.J. 306 (1975). Nortell explains
that the supreme court in Montgomery avoided establishing a rule which would require that a
factual determination be made on a case by case basis and provided a legal rule that there is
always fraud if a Totten trust is established to the deprivation of the surviving spouse. He
further states that since there is not always actual fraud in such situations, the supreme court
created a category of legal or statutory fraud. Regardless of the actual facts, a surviving spouse
in such circumstances will now be considered to be defrauded of his (or her) marital rights as a
matter of law. Id. at 310.
45. 50 II1. App. 838, 365 N.E.2d at 1062.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Contra, In re Estate of Elliott, 33 Ill. App.3d 1046, 1049, 339 N.E.2d 378, 380 (1st
Dist. 1975). The Elliott court held a land trust valid against a surviving spouse when the sur-
viving spouse failed to renounce decedent's will from which the surviving spouse received a
substantial inheritance. Moreover, the court found that the holding in Montgomery related only
to Totten trusts, and not to other types of inter vivos trusts. Id. at 1049, 339 N.E.2d at 380.
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finding, the court reasoned that although the issue in Montgomery
was phrased only to include Totten trusts, the decision itself was
based on prior case law that involved other types of revocable
trusts. 49 Additionally, the appellate court observed that the
Montgomery court acknowledged that a savings account trust is no
different in substance from other revocable trusts. 50  Hence, the ap-
pellate court rationalized its extension of Montgomery to include re-
vocable trusts in which the settlor retained ultimate control of the
trust property. In so doing, the Johnson court specifically rejected the
need to look to the intent of the decedent spouse and held that:
a trust may not be permitted to defeat the marital rights of a
settlor's surviving spouse where the settlor effectively retained ul-
timate control of the trusts assets. To do so would defeat the pur-
poses of the statute and frustrate the fundamental public policy
which it embodies. The disinheritance of a surviving spouse could
be accomplished by merely changing the document controlling the
devolution of property on death from a will to a trust. This would
permit a decedent to do by indirect means that which cannot be
done directly. This court will not so exalt form over substance. 51
By adopting a "retention of control" test with no consideration of
the "equities," the appellate court made revocable trusts in which the
decedent reserved the right of ultimate control 52 over the trust prop-
erty, like Totten trusts, per se invalid against surviving spouses.53
The Johnson court distinguishes Elliott as dicta and states:
We find that every point of distinction between Montgomery and Elliott fails be-
tween Montgomery and the case at bar. In Elliott, decedent had appointed a third
party as trustee as compared to Montgomery where the decedent appointed herself
as trustee. In the instant case decedent declared herself trustee. In Elliott, the
decedent parted with an interest during life because he entered into a joint tenancy
with the respondent where a vested beneficial interest passed immediately. In
Montgomery and in the instant case, the decedent parted with nothing during her
lifetime. Finally, in Elliott, the decedent amply provided for his wife by will which
she did not renounce, while in Montgomery and in the instant case, the decedent
provided virtually nothing for her surviving spouse. 50 I11. App.3d at 839, 365
N.E.2d at 1062.
49. As examples, the Johnson court cited Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill.2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600
(1955) and Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). For a discussion of Farkas,
see note 74 infra. For a discussion of Newman, see notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
50. 50 I11. App.3d at 839 N.E.2d at 1062, citing In re Estate of Petralia, 32 Ill.2d 134,
204 N.E.2d 1 (1965). For a discussion of In re Estate of Petralia, see note 39 supra.
51. 50 I11. App.3d at 841, 365 N.E.2d at 1063-64.
52. There is uncertanity as to the amount of retained control necessary to render a trust
illusory, although a trust in which a power of revocation or modification is reserved subject to
attack by the surviving spouse. See DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS, supra note 5, at 502.
Examples of the various degrees of control which can be reserved by the settlor in the adminis-
tration of a trust include the power to initiate or veto investments or sales; to act as co-trustee;
to vote stock; to use, occupy, manage, control, improve, or lease land which is the corpus of the
trust; and to make the trustee's powers of control subject to the settlor's written instructions.
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In reaching its decision, the appellate court in Johnson also distin-
guished Rose and other prior Illinois cases in which the courts had
questioned the intent of the decedent. 54 The appellate court's deci-
sion noted that Illinois courts had inquired into donative intent of the
settlor only in cases in which the settlor had parted duripng lifetime
with an immediate interest in the transferred property. 55  For exam-
ple, in Rose the trust under attack was irrevocable; and therefore, the
settlor was precluded from regaining ownership of the trust property.
In such cases, the trust will be valid if the settlor had an intent other
than to defeat the marital rights of the surviving spouse. In
Montgomery and Johnson, however, the settlors did not relinquish
any incidents of ownership in the transferred property during
lifetime. Because the trust property in reality belonged to the settlor,
the Johnson court found that the intent of the decedent making the
transfer was irrelevant. Therefore, the Johnson court held that "with-
out the mitigating factor of parting with incidents of ownership, the
statutory policy against complete disinheritance of the spouse pre-
vails." 56
In categorizing Rose with other Illinois cases, the Johnson court
failed to distinguish the difference between Missouri and Illinois case
law on the meaning of "intent". In Rose, the Illinois court was ap-
plying a Missouri statute which makes all inter vivos transfers subject
MACDONALD, supra note 13 at 89. In Smith, Newman, and Johnson, the settlor retained the
right to income and to revoke the trust as well as the right to exercise extensive control over
the trust corpus. It is uncertain if the trust would be illusory if each of these powers were
standing alone or if two out of the three powers were combined. A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS, § 57.5 at 511-12 (3d ed. 1967).
53. The trust will always be invalid even if the equities are in favor of upholding. For
examples of such fact situations, see note 84 and accompanying text, infra. For a discussion of
the per se invalidation of Totten trusts, see note 44 and accompanying text supra.
54. II1 App.3d 830, 841, 365 N.E.2d 1056, 1064, citing: Holmes v. Mims, 1 Ill.2d 274, 115
N.E.2d 790 (1953); Hoeffner v. Hoeffner, 389 I11. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 (1945); Toman v.
Svoboda, 39 Ill. App.3d 394, 349 N.E.2d 668 (1st Dist. 1976); Levites v. Levites, 27 I11. App.2d
274, 169 N.E.2d 574 (1st Dist. 1960).
In Holmes, decedent entered in to a joint tenancy arrangement with respect to a savings
account with his second wife. Subsequently, his first wife set aside a divorce decree and chal-
lenged the validity of the transfer. In Hoeffner, the decedent, a mortgagee, purchased property
on foreclosure and had the certificate of sale and master's deed made to himself and his daugh-
ter in joint tenancy. In Torman, the surviving spouse sought to impose a constructive trust
upon shares of stock to which decedent's sister held title as a surviving joint tenant of a joint
tenancy created by decedent. In Levites, decedent purchased savings bonds in joint tenancy
with various relatives. In each case, the respective court held that a husband may absolutely
dispose of a part or all of his personal property during marriage unless the transaction is a sham
and colorable or illusory and tantamount to fraud.
55. 50 I11. App.3d at 841, 365 N.E.2d 1064.
56. Id.
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to the "equities" test in order to determine if a decedent intended to
defraud the surviving spouse. 57 In Illinois, however, the "equities"
test has not been adopted as a measure of intent. 58 Hence, the
Johnson court set forth in dicta a standard for establishing the intent
of a decedent to defraud the surviving spouse which was inconsistent
with existing Illinois law.
A BETTER APPROACH
The policy behind the statute providing for the spouse's minimum
statutory share is to "prevent a surviving spouse from being left desti-
tute where the deceased spouse has assets which would prevent such
a result." 59 Therefore, the "retention of control" test as used by the
appellate court in Johnson is applied inappropriately in certain cir-
cumstances because the policy is not always furthered. In other
words, trusts should not be invalidated as against surviving spouses
who have other substantial means of support. 60
To avoid this result, the appellate court should have adopted an
approach combining the "retention of control" and the "equities"
tests. In utilizing this combination test, the court first should have
determined whether the decedent spouse maintained ultimate control
over the trust property during the lifetime. If so, the trust should
have been invalidated as against the surviving spouse only if the ap-
plication of the "equities" test required such a result.
This approach combines the benefits of both the "retention of con-
trol" test and the "equities" test. The use of the retention of control
portion of the combination test gives the court firm guidelines upon
which to exercise its judgment. The equities portion of the test in-
sures that a trust will not be invalidated in circumstances in which
invalidation would be inappropriate because of the policy considera-
tion behind the statute providing for the spouse's minimum share. 61
57. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
58. Contra Toman v. Svoboda, 39 Ill. App.3d 394, 349 N.E.2d 668 (lst Dist. 1976). In
Toman, the appellate court upheld a transfer of stock made by a decedent spouse into joint
tenancy with his sister. In its decision, the court ascertained by considering the equitable fac-
tors of Rose that the decedent had present, not testamentary, donative intent at the time the
transfer was made. In doing so, the court, after finding that Rose was not indicative of Illinois
law, cited no authority for finding the Rose factors relevant to the inquiry. Id. at 400, 349
N.E.2d at 674.
59. 50 Ill. App.3d at 840, 365 N.E.2d at 1062.
60. For example, the trust could be invalid against a surviving spouse to whom the dece-
dent had made generous inter vivos transfers. See MACDONALD, supra note 13, at 96. See also
Schuyler, supra note 20, at § 74.1301.
61. For example, under the combination test, a trust for the benefit of a relative of modest
economic means would not be invalidated against a surviving spouse to whom the decedent had
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In implementing this approach, the appellate court should have
limited the application of Montgomery to Totten trusts. The factual
situation in Montgomery was not "directly parallel" to the factual situ-
ation in Johnson because the degree of control a settlor can exercise
over a Totten trust is greater than that which a settlor can normally
exercise over other types of revocable trusts. In a Totten trust the
settlor can control the corpus by merely making a withdrawal from
his savings account. 62 In other types of revocable trusts, however,
the settlor must satisfy certain formalities to revoke or control the
administration of the trust. 63 Furthermore, a Totten trust is subject
to claims of creditors 64 while other types of revocable trusts cus-
tomarily are not.65
Also, the Johnson court's rationale for extending the Montgomery
decision to the revocable inter vivos trusts is subject to still other
criticism since the issue and the holding formulated by the Montgom-
made generous inter vivos transfers. Even if the court found the trust suspect because the
settlor retained ultimate control of the trust assets during his lifetime, the trust would be valid
because the equities would weigh in favor of upholding the trust.
62. See note 39 supra.
63. The settlor would have to make a written request or revocation to his trustee. If the
settlor was his own trustee he would still have to document any action he took in regard to the
trust assets since he was acting in a dual capacity.
64. Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill.2d 532, 538, 301 N.E.2d 465, 468 (1973). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 Comment (1959). The authors of the RESTATEMENT
state:
Although creditors of the settlor cannot reach the trust property merely because he
has reserved the power of revocation. . . creditors of a person who makes a savings
deposit upon a tenative trust [Totten] can reach his interest, since he has such
extensive powers over the deposit as to justify treating him as in substance the
unrestricted owner of the deposit. So also, on death of the depositor if the deposit
is needed for the payment of his debts, his creditors can reach it. So also, if it is
needed it can be applied to the payment of his funeral expenses and the expenses of
the administration of his estate, if he had not sufficient other property which can be
applied for these purposes.
65. Unlike in the case of the Totten trust, creditors cannot reach the assets of a revocable
trust merely because of the amount of control reserved by the settlor. They can, however, reach
the trust asset if the conveyance was fraudulent through rights given to them by statute. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 59, § 54 (1975). The statute provides:
Every gift, grant, conveyance, assignment or transfer of or charge upon any estate,
real or personal, or right or think in action, or any rent or profit thereof, made with
the intent to disturb, delay, hinder or defraud creditors or other persons, and every
bond or other evidence of debt given, suit commenced, or judgment entered, with
like intent, shall be void as against such creditors, purchasers and other persons.
But see, Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Il 116, 84 N.E.192 (1908) discussed at note 10 supra. For a
general discussion of creditors rights in the inter vivos trust in American jurisdictions, see
Schuyler, supra note 20 at § 74.1302. For a general discussion of creditor's rights, see Com-
ment, Enforcement of Creditors' Rights, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 424.
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ery court was phrased to include only Totten trusts.66 Moreover, the
Montgomery court's assertion that a savings account trust was no dif-
ferent in substance from other revocable trusts was made in reference
to the general validity of the Totten trust as an acceptable estate
planning tool. 67  The court's statement was not made to establish the
separate legal issue of the invalidity of the Totten trust vis-,6-vis the
surviving spouse.
THE EFFECT OF ILLUSORY TRANSFER ACT
Subsequent to the decision of the appellate court in Johnson, the
legislature passed Public Act 80-737688 (hereinafter called the Illusory
Transfer Act). The Act provides that a lifetime transfer cannot be
found illusory because the decedent retained any power or right with
respect to the property unless there is intent to defraud. 69
Since the Illusory Transfer Act does not specifically refer to trans-
fers made in fraud on the marital rights of a surviving spouse, 70 the
question remains whether the supreme court will interpret the scope
of the Act to include such transfers. 71  Although the Act purports to
66. 54 1ll.2d 532, 535, 301 N.E.2d 465, 466. "The question in the case at bar is whether a
'Totten Trust' is sufficiently testamentary in nature that by analogy the statutory policy of per-
mitting a surviving spouse to renounce under the decedent's will and share in the proceeds of
such estate should be applicable to such trust to the same extent as to an estate passing under a
will."
See City of Genesco v. Illinois N. Util. Co., 378 I11. 506, 39 N.E.2d 26 (1941) for the proposi-
tion that a judicial opinion applies only to the facts involved.
67. The trust is valid despite the depositor's non-compliance with the formalities required
by the Statute of Wills. See note 39 supra.
68. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 701, 702 (1977) provides:
Section 701. An otherwise valid transfer of property in trust or otherwise, by a
decedent during his or her lifetime, shall not in the absence or an intent to defraud,
be invalid, in whole or in part, on the ground that it is illusory because the dece-
dent retained any power or right with respect to the property. Section 702. This
Act takes effect upon becoming a law and applies to savings account trusts estab-
lished on or after its effective date, and as to all other transfers this Act is declara-
tory of existing law.
As House Bill 803, the Act was drafted and proposed as part of the- Joint Legislative Program
by the Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association, introduced in the 80th
Illinois General Assembly on March 17, 1977, and adopted by the 80th Illinois General Assem-
bly on June 24, 1977. House Bill 803 was approved by the Governor on September 16, 1977, as
Public Act 80-737. Brief for the Appellant at 32.
Furthermore, the Act was passed by unanimous vote in both the House and Senate. No
formal debate was conducted. Interview with Austin Fleming, of Counsel, Northern Trust Co.,
in Chicago (February, 1978).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 at § 701.
70. Id.
71. The supreme court could refuse to consider the Illusory Transfer Act in hearing Johnson
since it can be argued that to do otherwise would give the Act retroactive effect. See, County
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codify existing common law in Illinois, 72 it is at variance, however,
with existing case law concerning the validity of the inter vivos trust
vis-h-vis the surviving spouse. The Act requires, inter alia, a deter-
mination of the transferor's intent to defraud, while the courts in
Montgomery and Johnson would find a trust invalid vis-z-vis a sur-
viving spouse only upon a determination that the settlor had retained
ultimate control over the trust corpus. 73  This variance can be ration-
alized by interpreting the Act as a restatement of the law as to the
general validity of inter vivos transfers. 74 This interpretation would
be consistent with existing case law. 75
If the Illusory Transfer Act is read to apply to an inter vivos trust
vis-,z-vis the surviving spouse, the statute would appear to require a
two-step procedure to be followed before finding a revocable inter
vivos trust void as against a surviving spouse. First, a decedent will
have had to retain a power with respect to the property which would
lead to a determination by the court that the trust in question is
"illusory." It is clear under existing case law that an illusory trust is,
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knight, 40 1Il.2d 423, 240 N.E.2d 612 (1968) (Statutes are presumed to oper-
ate prospectively and not retroactively unless statutory language is so clear as to admit no other
construction.) However, it can be argued that the legislation did clearly intend to give the
Illusory Transfer Act retroactive effect by making it declaratory of existing law. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 3 § 702. Also, even if the court rules the Act should be applied prospectively, the
court could still rule on Johnson cognizant of legislative policy. See Schroeder v. Benz, 9 Ill.2d
589, 138 N.E.2d 496 (1956). In Schroeder, the supreme court stated:
Since the testatrix here died prior to the enactment of the statute, it is not control-
ling. However, we are convinced that the same rule should be applied. For al-
though not directly applicable, the Illinois statute does reflect a legislative policy
which should be taken into consideration.
Id. at 594, 138 N.E.2d at 499.
72. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3 at § 702.
73. See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.
74. The general validity of an inter vivos trust in which the settlor has retained the right to
the property has been established so long as the trust has not been attacked by the surviving
spouse. Such trusts have been challenged as attempted testamentary dispositions which should
be invalidated because of non-compliance by the settlor or with the Statute of Wills. See, e.g.,
Farkas v. Williams, 5 I11. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955). In Farkas, the administrators of
decedent's estate claimed that an inter vivos trust created by decedent was invalid in absence of
compliance with the statute governing the execution of wills. The supreme court held the trust
valid even though the settlor made himself sole trustee, reserved a life interest, and retained a
power of revocation. The court reasoned that the purpose behind the enactment of the Statute
of Wills was to prevent fraud and forgery by requiring that a will be executed in a solemn and
formal manner. The court found that the trust at issue was also created with such formalities so
as to insure against the presence of fraud and forgery; and therefore, should be valid. Id. at 433,
125 N.E.2d at 608-09. For discussion of application of this principal to Totten or savings account
trusts, see note 39 supra.
75. Should the court follow this interpretation of the Act, it would still be faced with the
issue of whether to extend the holding of Montgomery to revocable inter vivos trusts or to
formally recognize equitable factors in applying the retention of control test.
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inter alia,7 6 one in which the decedent retains the power to control
the trustees and reserves the right to receive income for life and the
right to revoke the trust. 7 7 Thus, this portion of the test will not
present much difficulty.
The second step of the procedure is problematical. It requires the
court to make a determination that the decedent intended to defraud
his spouse by making the transfer. The meaning of "intent" to de-
fraud, however, is unclear under existing case law. The proponents of
the statute intended to make the statute consistent with earlier
cases 78 in which a lifetime transfer of property made by a decedent
spouse was upheld against attack by the surviving spouse. The Illinois
Supreme Court in these cases acknowledged that a husband has an
absolute right to dispose of property during his lifetime provided the
transfer is not merely colorable and is unattended by circumstances
indicative of fraud upon the rights of the surviving spouse. 79
A colorable transfer is a sham in which there is no transfer at all or
a transfer accompanied by some secret agreement between the par-
ties that negates a donative intent on the part of the donor.80 If the
transfer is absolute, the transfer will be valid even though the precise
motive of the decedent was to minimize the statutory right of the
spouse. 8' In the past, transfers which have been found to be color-
able and attended by circumstances indicative of fraud have arisen in
cases in which the transferor has retained control and the right to the
76. See note 52, supra.
77. See notes 28-44 and accompanying test supra.
78. Remarks by Sherwin Corwin, judiciary Committe I of the Illinois House of Representa-
tives (April 6, 1977). As examples, Mr. Corwin cites Frey v. Wubbena, 26 I11. 2d 62, 185
N.E.2d 850 (1962); Holmes v. Mims, 1 1ll.2d 274, 115 N.E.2d 790 (1953); Hoeffner v. Hoeffner,
389 I11. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 (1945). In all three cases, transfers involving joint tenancy arrange-
ments were attacked by the surviving spouse. For a general discussion of the cases, see note 54
supra.
79. In each of these cases, the supreme court quotes 0. Bump, KERR ON FRAUD AND
MISTAKE 220 (1872).
80. In this book McDonald explains:
A typically colorable ('sham') arrangement would be a secret deed, handed over by
the husband to the obliging friend or relative whose name appears as 'grantee'. The
parties have previously agreed that the husband may demand the return of the
deed at his pleasure, in particular, if his wife should predecease him. If it is also
agreed that the deed in no circumstances is to be legally effective, the transfer is
clearly "colorable.'"
MACDONALD, supra note 13, at 134-35.
See., e.g., Blodgett v. Blodgett, 266 II1. App. 517 (2d Dist. 1932), transferred, 343 II1. 569,
175 N.E. 777 (1931). In Blodgett, the court held that a conveyance from a decedent to his
brother was colorable when the surviving spouse produced a statement of account executed by
the brother showing that he recognized decedent's interest in the land.
81. Padfield v. Padfield, 78 I11. 16, 19 (1875).
[Vol. 27:911
LAGRANGE STATE BANK
income from a revocable inter vivos trust.8 2. In no case has the court
found circumstances indicative of fraud solely because of the trans-
feror's subjective intent to defraud his spouse.8 3
Since the prior law is not illustrative of what "intent to defraud"
means, its interpretation under the statute remains to be resolved. It
could be interpreted to mean a subjective intent to diminish the de-
cedent's estate in order to minimize the spouse's statutory share. Al-
ternatively, it could be interpreted to mean intent as measured by
objective manifestations of the factors announced in Rose.
The "subjective" intent test should not be adopted by the Illinois
courts because evidence as to the decedent's intent is unreliable.
Since the transferor is dead, evidence will usually be obtained from
litigants who do not have a detached point of view. Also, an intent to
transfer assets outside one's probate estate may be praiseworthy or
deplorable depending on the circumstances of the case. For example,
a settlor may have provided for his spouse amply by other inter vivos
transfers, and he may wish to provide for an aging parent by means of
a trust. On the other hand, the decedent may have ill feelings toward
his spouse and, therefore, wish to disinherit the surviving spouse
leaving her without any means of support.8 4
Since the "intent" aspect of the combination test required by the
Illusory Transfer Act is open to interpretation, the Illinois courts
should adopt an intent to defraud test which will inquire into objec-
tive manifestations of intent. This approach would be more consistent
with Illinois precedent inasmuch as the courts prior to Montgomery
seemed to have impliedly weighed the "equities" of the case.8 5
THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
Because of the numerous considerations involved, it is difficult to
predict whether the Illinois Supreme Court will uphold or invalidate
the trust at issue in Johnson. One factor which will affect the decison
is the weight, if any, given by the court to the Illusory Transfer Act.
If the court finds that the Act does apply in this case,8 6 the validity of
the trust will rest intimately on whether the court finds that the de-
82. Smith v. Northern Trust, 322 111. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1st Dist. 1944).
83. See note 58 supra.
84. See generally MAcDONALD, supra note 13, at 117. In the "equities" approach motive as
intent to minimize the surviving spouse's statutory share would be relevant, but not essential.
Id. at 118.
85. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
86. The court could either give the Act retroactive effect or weigh the Act in its decision
stating that the Act reflects legislative policy. See note 71 supra.
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cedent attempted to defraud his spouse. 87 If, however, the court
determines that the Act is inapplicable,88 it could follow one of two
alternatives. The court could invalidate the trust finding that
Montgomery and Smith are clear precedents for establishing a "reten-
tion of control" test without giving any consideration to the dece-
dent's intent or to any equitable factors. 89 Alternatively, the court
could adopt a combination test by recognizing both the precedent for
establishing the "retention of control" test and the equitable factors
which Illinois courts, prior to Montgomery, had impliedly weighed in
deciding whether a trust should be invalidated when attacked by a
surviving spouse. 90
In applying this combination test to the facts in Johnson, the su-
preme court should first hold that the trust is illusory, but not as yet
void, pursuant to the "retention of control" portion of the test be-
cause Mrs. Johnson retained the right to control the assets of the
trust, the right to receive income from those assets and the power to
revoke the trust. The validity of the trust would then depend upon
the factual determination to be made by the court after weighing the
equitable factors of the case. 9 ' Thus, the court should first consider
the factors which weigh in favor of upholding the trust including the
knowledge of the surviving spouse that his wife was creating a trust
and his choice not to involve himself in the matter. The court might
also note the extreme wealth of the surviving spouse in relation to the
value of the assets in the trust, the economic needs of the decedent's
family, the devise by the decedent under her will of her realty to her
husband, and the trial court's finding that a loving and harmonious
relationship existed between the spouses. Secondly, the court should
87. See notes 78-85 and accompanying text supra.
88. In so doing, the court could interpret the Act to apply only to the general validity of
lifetime transfers, not to transfers made vis-a-vis the surviving spouse. See notes 70-75 and
accompanying text supra. Alternatively, the court could hold that the Act should not be consid-
ered in Johnson because to do so would improperly give the Act retroactive effect. See note 71
supra.
89. See notes 28-34 and 38-44 and accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
91. See note 23 and accompanying text supra. After finding Rose not controlling in reaching
its decision, the appellate court in Johnson found in dicta that the equitable factors should be
weighed in favor of invalidating the trust. The court stated that the factors which militate most
strongly against the trust were that the decedent gave nothing away before she died and that
she virtually excluded her spouse from sharing in her wealth upon her death. The court was
silent as to other factors which should have been considered in the determination. 50 Ill.
App.3d 830, 840, 365 N.E.2d 1056, 1063. This finding seems to conflict with the trial court's
finding that the allegations of fraud made by the plaintiff were untrue, made in bad faith and
without reasonable cause. Id. at 832, 365 N.E.2d at 1058.
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consider the equitable factors which may invalidate the trust. These
factors include the decedent's exclusion of the surviving husband from
the majority of her wealth, the decedent's creation of the trust -after
learning about her terminal illness, and the absence of consideration
given by the beneficiaries of the trust.9"
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court in Johnson should adopt an approach
combining the "retention of control" test with the "equities" test.
This would be consistent with Illinois decisions prior to Montgomery
which indirectly considered equitable factors in applying the "reten-
tion of control" test and with the Illusory Transfer Act which the
drafters intended to be a codification of existing law. Moreover, if the
Justices weigh the Illusory Transfer Act in reaching their decision,
they should not adopt a "subjective intent to defraud" test because
evidence as to the decedent's intent is unreliable. The court also
should reject any approach requiring the sole application of the "re-
tention of control" test because the policy behind the spouse's
minimum statutory share is not promoted when the surviving spouse
has other substantial means of support.
In implementing this combination approach, the supreme court
should uphold the validity of the trust based upon the equities. Since
the surviving husband knew that his wife was creating a trust and
chose not to involve himself in the matter during her lifetime, he
should be estopped from claiming that the trust operated to his det-
riment after his wife's death. Furthermore, the surviving husband in
this case will not be left destitute if he is unable to reach the assets of
the trust. Therefore, since the policy behind the spouse's statutory
minimum share is no longer served, the policy favoring free aliena-
bility of property should prevail.
Janice Neunark
92. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
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